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REPRESENTING POTENTIAL LITIGANTS AS
PARTIES TO NTSB PUBLIC HEARINGS: SOME
PROBLEMS IN SEARCH OF SOLUTIONS
JOHN D. CLEMEN*
STEPHEN R. LONG**
SHANLEY & FISHER, P.C.***
Cross examination ... is beyond any doubt the greatest
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.'
AT NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION Safety Board
Hearings, this engine has been reduced to a sputter
because of the National Transportation Safety Board's
(NTSB) 1986 amendment of its public hearing regula-
tion.2 The amendment, which frames questions of consti-
tutional proportion, added the provision that "parties [to
NTSB public hearings] shall be represented by suitable
qualified technical employees or members who do not oc-
* John D. Clemen, a partner at Shanley & Fisher, specializes in aviation litiga-
tion and product liability. An active trial attorney, he serves on the Forum Com-
mittee on Aviation and Space Law of the American Bar Association. Mr. Clemen
is also an active member of the Aviation Law Committee of the New Jersey Bar
Association. He is a graduate of Hobart College and Seton Hall University School
of Law.
** Stephen R. Long, a partner at Shanley & Fisher, is a member of the New
Jersey Bar Association, the Trial Attorneys of New Jersey and the Association of
the Federal Bar of New Jersey. He is a graduate of Seton Hall University and
Seton Hall University School of Law.
*** Shanley and Fisher is one New Jersey's largest law firms. Its aviation law
section has represented the major airlines, fixed base operators, operators of cor-
porate air fleets and manufacturers of aircraft and avionics in a variety of matters
including product liability, negligence, warranty and anti-trust litigation.
1 5J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (1974).
2 49 C.F.R. § 845.13(a) (1990).
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cupy legal positions."'3 The regulation thus proscribes at-
torney representation of the parties at NTSB public
hearings in favor of appearances by "technical employ-
ees." This article will address some of the questions
presented by this agency action.
I. INTRODUCTION
The NTSB is a small agency with a big mission. Con-
gress created it to investigate and determine the probable
cause of civil aviation accidents and to find ways to in-
crease air safety.4 To this end, the NTSB may hold public,
trial-like hearings at which designated parties and non-
party witnesses present tangible and testimonial evidence
regarding the cause of an accident.5 Factual findings and
conclusions of probable cause ultimately are drawn by the
Board from this record and published in a formal accident
report. The record and accident report, in turn, may play
an important role in other forums, including civil actions
arising out of the accident.6
Congress provided the NTSB with independence from
other governmental agencies and with autonomy to pur-
sue the facts and determine the cause of air accidents. In
many ways, its powers and procedures are similar to those
of the courts'. 7 The Board ultimately draws factual find-
ings and conclusions of probable cause from this record
for publication in a formal accident report. The formal
report can have enormous impact on civil litigation per-
taining to an air accident, not to mention related criminal
actions, enforcement proceedings, and employer actions.
Id. § 845.13(a).
49 U.S.C. app. § 1901(l)(1988).
Independent Safety Board Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1901-1907 (1988).
The NTSB's authority extends to all transportation accidents. Id. § 1903(a).
I; The tensions which give rise to the issues discussed here originate in the com-
mon goal shared by the NTSB in an accident investigation and the parties to civil
litigation arising from the same accident: both seek to identify the cause of the
accident. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 845.1-.51 (1990).
7 See e.g., id. § 821.
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The stakes, therefore, are often high for parties to a pub-
lic hearing.
The NTSB's effort to pursue its investigations free from
all outside influences conflicts considerably with the par-
ties' need to protect vital interests which may be adversely
affected by the fruits of the investigation. The Safety
Board has reacted strongly to manifestations of this con-
flict. At first, the Board limited parties' rights to counsel
of their choice.8 In 1986, its regulatory measure removed
party attorneys from public hearings altogether.9 The
Board described its motivation to limit party representa-
tion as an effort to insulate itself from involvement in the
litigation process.'° In a formal request for comments on
the amendment to section 845.13(a), the Safety Board
stated:
Part 845 is intended, among other things, to prevent the
injection of liability interests into the Board's hearings as
evidenced by the prohibition against a party being repre-
sented by a person who also represents claimants or insur-
ers. As noted above, the purpose of the Board's accident
inquiries is not to determine the rights or liabilities of any
person, and consistent with this objective, the amendment
served to distance further the Board's hearings from the
litigation that inevitably arises from major transportation
accidents by precluding attorneys from acting as
spokespersons. "
Indeed, the NTSB's general counsel, addressing the
Safety Board's view of involvement with litigation, noted
that:
The term "entanglement" is, in my view, an extremely apt
and descriptive word - it conjures up an image of the
Board's investigation becoming intertwined with the ten-
tacles of the litigation. It is therefore the Board's policy,
44 Fed. Reg. 34,420 (1979).
49 C.F.R. § 845.13(b) (1990). Since the NTSB's inception, 49 C.F.R.
§ 845.13(b) and its predecessors precluded public hearing representation by "any
persons who also represents claimants or insurers." Id.
51 Fed. Reg. 7278 (1986) (codified at 49 C.F.R. § 845.13(a)).
52 Fed. Reg. 9679 (1987) (codified at 49 C.F.R. § 845.13(a)).
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as expressed in its regulations and practices which I shall
discuss below, to maintain the litigation at an arm's length
distance so that we can complete our investigation as ex-
peditiously and effectively as possible.' 2
The 1986 amendment to section 845.13(a) appears to
be one expression of the Safety Board's policy of keeping
litigation forces at "arm's length." The overt denial of
representation by counsel raises a host of issues concern-
ing the efficacy and wisdom of the regulation. To begin
with, it is not at all clear whether denying attorney repre-
sentation at NTSB public hearings insulates the Board
from the pressure of outside litigation. Nor is it clear
such representation interferes with the Board's responsi-
bility to investigate and determine probable cause.' 3
Another issue which arises is whether the 1986 amend-
ment to section 845.13(a) represents an over-reaction to
the perception that the "tentacles" of civil litigation may
strangle the NTSB. This inquiry raises several sub-issues:
(1) How serious a threat is the participation of counsel at
public hearings? (2) Is the regulation rationally related to
its professed goal of insulating the NTSB from undue in-
volvement with civil litigation? (3) Even if an adequate
nexus exists, does the regulation infringe upon a right to
counsel inherent in basic ideas of fairness and due
process?
The following discussion traces the origins of section
845.13(a) and some of these issues raised. The paper also
analyzes the regulation against the backdrop of the
NTSB's congressional mandate, the forces the NTSB per-
ceives as the "tentacles of litigation," and the considera-
ble impact the NTSB public hearing has on civil litigation.
II. THE NTSB's AIR SAFETY MANDATE
The genesis of the federal government's involvement in
'2 NTSB, REPORT ON PROCEEDINGS, AVIATION ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION SYMPO-
SIUM, NTSB/RP-84/01, at 46 (1983).
," 49 C.F.R. § 845.2 (1990).
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civil air accident investigation and aviation safety is in the
Air Commerce Act of 1926.14 This measure empowered
the Secretary of Commerce to investigate, record and
make public the causes of civil air navigation accidents in
the United States.' 5 The Act established a special investi-
gation division which functioned for more than a
decade. 16
In 1938, Congress found the Air Commerce Act of
1926 inadequate in its creation of a decentralized federal
authority which detracted from the efficiency of the gov-
ernment in regulating the aviation industry.' 7 As a result,
Congress promulgated and passed the Civil Aeronautics
Act.' 8 The Act created the Civil Aeronautics Authority' 9
which included an entity known as the Air Safety Board. °
The Air Safety Board was specifically authorized to inves-
tigate accidents, determine probable cause, make public
reports and recommend future safety measures.2 ' In
1940, the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 subsumed the
Civil Aeronautics Authority and the Air Safety Board
within the newly created Civil Aeronautics Board.22
The 1958 Federal Aviation Act (the 1958 Act) further
refined the federalization of air safety.23 A statement to
Congress from President Eisenhower began the legisla-
tive process which culminated in this comprehensive Act.
The President observed:
Recent midair collisions of aircraft, occasioning tragic
losses of human life, have emphasized the need for a sys-
14 Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 254, §§ 1-14, 44 Stat. 568.
- Id. § 2(e).
w Id. § 2. The next promulgation of air commerce regulations, which included
the establishment of a safety investigation division for the aviation industry, oc-
curred in 1938. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 706, 52 Stat. 973.
17 H.R. REP. No. 2360, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3741, 3743.
is Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, supra note 16.
19 Id. § 201(a).
20 Id. § 701 (a).
21 Id. § 702(a)(1)-(5).
22 H.R. REP. No. 2360, supra note 17.
23 Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1557 (1988).
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tem of air traffic management which will prevent ... a re-
currence of such accidents.... I am recommending to the
Congress the establishment of an aviation organization in
which would be consolidated.., all the essential manage-
ment functions necessary to support the common needs of
our civil and military aviation.
Due to these concerns, the 1958 Act specifically aug-
mented the powers of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
in several areas including licensing and economic regula-
tion.25 Although accident investigation remained within
the CAB's purview, the agency's powers in this area were
not extended.
Congress created the NTSB in 1966 by enacting the
Department of Transportation Act.2 6 For the first time, a
safety board, rather than the Secretary of the Department
of Transportation, was given the independent duty of
"[d]etermining the cause or probable cause of transporta-
tion accidents and reporting the facts, conditions, and cir-
cumstances relating to such accidents."' 7 To perform this
function, Congress gave the NTSB the authority to hold
independent hearings regarding accidents .21 According
to Congress:
The Board's function in the progress of the accident inves-
tigations is to provide an independent tribunal which, un-
restricted by departmental or other loyalty or partiality,
can examine the extent to which accident investigations
fairly state the circumstances of an accident. In other
words, the Board, with its independent status, provides a
mechanism whereby the record of accident investigation
made by the Department will be reviewed to determine
the cause or probable cause of an accident. 9
The general thrust of the enabling legislation was to cre-
24 H.R. REP. No. 2360, supra note 17 at 3742.
25 See Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1371-1389 (1988).
2 Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. app. § § 1651-1660 (1988).
27 Id.
28 H.R. REP. No. 1701, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 55, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE




ate an independent body, insulated from pressure by
other agencies and dedicated solely to the discovery of the
cause of accidents. Congress considered the creation of
such an independent agency the most efficient method of
serving the public interest in air safety.3 °
The NTSB became a truly independent governmental
body with the enactment of the Independent Safety Board
Act of 1974. 3 1 This Act withdrew the NTSB from the con-
trol of the Department of Transportation and made it an
autonomous agency.32 The desire to supply the NTSB
with more independence and further insulate it from pos-
sible conflicts with other agencies provided the rationale
for this change. 3 Congress again underscored its desire
to legislate true independence for the Safety Board: "Be-
cause many of its investigations involve other government
agencies and because some of its conclusions may involve
severe criticism of such agencies . . . this agency would
best serve the nation and fulfill its role if it were a totally
separate and independent agency." 34
Congress could not have made any clearer its intention
to insulate the NTSB's fact-finding function from any
prospect of compromise by means of influence from other
agencies. Nothing in the record suggests, however, that
Congress realized, much less intended, that the NTSB
deny parties the representation of counsel at public hear-
ings as a result of its perception of encroachment from
civil litigation. To the contrary, when Congress passed
the 1974 Independent Safety Board Act, NTSB regula-
tions did not proscribe attorney representation at public
hearings, and the NTSB allowed such representation until
March 1986.3 5 General principles of statutory construc-
tion presume that Congress knew of and approved this
I ld. at 3367.
49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1901-1907 (1988).
3' Id. § 1902(a).
:'i Id. § 1901(2).
- H.R. REP. No. 103, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7669, 7694.
'. 14 C.F.R. § 431.20 (1973).
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procedure. 6
Questions still remain whether precluding representa-
tion by counsel at public hearings (i) in any meaningful
way furthers the goal of NTSB independence, (ii) deprives
the public of fully developed records of public hearings,
and (iii) deprives the parties of fundamental rights. At a
minimum, the NTSB, the public, and the parties each
have a strong interest in the complete cross-examination
of witnesses because NTSB regulations model public
hearings after the civil trial. The results of this effort-the
record and the accident report-may have immeasurable
impact on parties in subsequent lawsuits.
III. THE PUBLIC HEARING AND ITS EFFECTS ON CIVIL
LITIGATION
An NTSB accident investigation is analogous to a civil
action. The Safety Board has broad power to gather and
assess facts.3 7 Typically, the chief investigator designates
other NTSB investigators to chair committees or groups
assigned to investigate particular aspects of the accident.3 8
The Safety Board may compel examination of persons,
documents and things by subpoena.3 9 It may conduct
such investigation and testing as it deems feasible.4" Fi-
nally, it may determine that a public hearing should be
held "in the public interest."'"
The NTSB public hearing bears strong resemblance to
a civil trial. A prehearing conference identifies witnesses,
issues, evidence and exhibits. 42 At the hearing, parties ex-
- New York Council Ass'n of Civilian Technicians v. F.L.R.A., 757 F.2d 502,
509 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 846 (1985). But see Washington Hosp.
Center v. Bowen, 795 F.2d 139, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (recognizing that only if
Congress is silent as to an administrative agency's authority to interpret a statute,
a court may assume that "Congress implicitly delegated the interpretative func-
tion to the agency").
37 49 U.S.C. app. § 1903(b)(1),(2) (1988).
- 49 C.F.R. § 831.8 (1990).
- 49 U.S.C. app. § 1903(b)(1).
, 49 C.F.R. § 845.20 (1990).
41 Id. § 845.10.
42 Id.
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amine and cross-examine witnesses under oath. 3 In fact,
the NTSB mandates that the parties "shall be given the
opportunity" to cross-examine witnesses. 4 The chairman
of the hearing, usually a Safety Board member, considers
objections to and determines the admissibility of prof-
fered evidence.4 5 Following the hearings, the parties may
submit proposed findings of fact and probable cause.4 6
Thereafter, the Safety Board issues its formal accident
report.4 7
Prior to the 1986 amendment, the NTSB allowed party
representation by counsel, albeit not necessarily counsel
of the parties' choice.48 Under the 1986 amendment, Sec-
tion 845.13(a) has precluded party representation by any-
one other than "suitable qualified technical employees or
members who do not occupy legal positions. '4 9 Tasks
best suited to a trained and experienced trial attorney -
issue identification, evidence assessment and objections,
adherence to rules of procedure and examination of wit-
nesses - are thrust upon party representatives "who do
not occupy legal positions. 50 Surely a chief mechanic
cannot expose the half truths in a recalcitrant witness' tes-
timony as well as a trial lawyer. One could equally con-
clude that the amendment to section 845.13(a) diminishes
the very right to cross-examine which the NTSB acknowl-
edges in section 845.25(a). 5'
4-1 Id. § 845.25(a).
44 Id.
4-1 Id. § 845.20(c).
46 Id. § 845.27.
47 Id. § 845.40.
48 Id. § 845.13(b). Section 845.13(b) and its predecessor regulations preclude
representation at a public hearing by "any person who also represents claimants
or insurers." Id. This provision seems unclear. It appears, however, broad
enough to permit the NTSB to attempt to disqualify attorneys retained to repre-
sent parties by or through insurance companies or attorneys who represent par-
ties in a civil action. One might ask then whether crossclaims between defendants
to a tort action for contribution or indemnification are "claims" brought by
"claimants".
4' Id. § 845.13(a).
5' Id.
49 C.F.R. § 845.25(a) provides that after an initial inquiry by a technical
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The record from the NTSB public hearing may have
tremendous impact on subsequent civil actions. The po-
tential uses of the NTSB record are myriad.52 For exam-
ple, the transcript from an NTSB hearing may be used in
a later civil or criminal trial to impeach witnesses or to
refresh their recollections. Furthermore, testimony, com-
mittee reports, and even accident reports may be admissi-
ble, in whole or in part, as substantive evidence.5 3 Thus,
vital property and liberty interests of the parties, includ-
ing prospective monetary judgments and damaged repu-
tations, may be at stake depending on the state of the
public hearing record and the basis for the NTSB's acci-
dent report. It is a great burden to persuade the trial fact-
finder to disregard facts previously found by the NTSB.
Furthermore, it is naive to suggest that a party subjected
to unfavorable NTSB findings suffers no disadvantage be-
cause the lawsuit will raise the issues de novo.
These concerns underlie the questions about the effi-
cacy and constitutional soundness of 49 C.F.R.
§ 845.13(a).
IV. THE ISSUES
Chief among the legal issues raised by the NTSB's 1986
amendment to 49 C.F.R. § 845.13 are: (i) whether denial
of attorney representation at public hearings impinges on
a right to counsel expressed in the Administrative Proce-
panel, parties to the hearing may examine the witnesses. 49 C.F.R. § 845.25(a)
(1990). See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
52 Any detailed discussion of this area of the law would double the length of this
article, hence an exhaustive discussion is not undertaken here.
" The many nuances presented by the interplay between applicable evidence
law and the federal statutory scheme regarding admissibility of NTSB probable
cause findings put detailed discussions beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g.,
49 U.S.C. §§ 581, 1903(c) (1988). For a general discussion of the issues, see L.
KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAw, §§ 18.01-05 (1971); Aircraft Accident Investi-
gations, 2 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 6,709 (1988) (NTSB reports shall not be admitted as
evidence in any action for damages growing out of a matter mentioned in such
reports); see also Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988) (admitting
into evidence a United States Navy accident report concerning an airplane crash,
which included both factual and opinion information, as a hearsay exception
within FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(c)).
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dure Act (APA) or a right implicit in the protections af-
forded by the due process clause of the fifth amendment
to the United States Constitution, and (ii) whether the
regulation constitutes an arbitrary and capricious abuse of
agency discretion.
A. The Procedural Requirements of the APA
Whenever life, liberty, or property are deprived by the
federal government, the procedure by which this depriva-
tion occurs must comply with the due process clause of
the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution.54
Procedural due process, particularly the right to counsel,
applies to certain administrative agency proceedings.5 5
Congress has acknowledged this precept and incorpo-
rated it in the APA.56
Where the APA applies to an agency adjudication, the
right to counsel attaches. Specifically, the APA entitles a
party to an adjudicatory hearing "to be accompanied, rep-
resented, and advised by counsel or, if permitted by the
agency, by other qualified representative. ' 5 8 This statu-
tory right to counsel extends to allow counsel to accom-
pany, represent and advise the witness without limitation
during the hearing.59
These procedural aspects of the APA, however, do not
apply to all agency proceedings. 60 Rather, they apply only
See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177 (1976).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140-41 (1976). See also 5 U.S.C. § 555 (1988).
5 U.S.C. §§ 500-559 (1988).
.7 Id. § 555(b).
I ld.
Backer v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1960).
5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988). Section 554(a) reads as follows:
(a) This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, in
every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on
the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, except to the
extent that there is involved -
(1) a matter subject to a subsequent trial of the law and the facts de
novo in a court;
(2) the selection or tenure of an employee except a administration
law judge appointed under section 3105 of this title;
9791991]
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to agency adjudictions. 6' The APA defines "adjudica-
tion" as "agency process for the formulation of an or-
der."' 62 The statute defines "order" as "the whole or part
of a final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, in-
junctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter
other than rule making but including licensing. 63
While an NTSB public hearing may be all that is re-
quired to dispose of a matter before the agency, the pro-
cedural safeguards of the APA still may not be implicated.
According to the NTSB, the APA does not apply to its
public hearings because its "hearings are factfinding pro-
ceedings with no formal issues and no adverse parties and
are not subject to the [adjudicatory] provisions of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act."'64 The NTSB's position on
this issue may have some support in case law. For ex-
ample, the United States Supreme Court has recognized
that while an administrative hearing may technically result
in a final disposition of that hearing, it may not result in
the formulation of an "order" as defined by the APA. A
final disposition will only be an "order" for purposes of
the APA if it has "some determinate consequences for the
party to the proceeding. '65 It is not enough that an
agency decision will have a practical consequence in a
subsequent proceeding.66
In light of the existing decisional law, it appears that the
procedural safeguards of the APA, including the statutory
right to counsel, do not apply to an NTSB public hearing.
(3) proceedings in which decisions rest solely on inspections, tests,
or elections;
(4) the conduct of military or foreign affairs functions;
(5) cases in which an agency is acting as an agent for a court; or




,, Id. § 551(6).
,i 49 C.F.R. § 845.2 (1990).
61 International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Local 134, International Bd. of Elec. Work-
ers, 419 U.S. 428, 443 (1975).
I,;, d. at 445.
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B. Procedural Due Process
Even if the NTSB position on applicability of the proce-
dural aspects of the APA is valid, NTSB public hearing
procedures must satisfy the basic tenets of procedural due
process. The starting point of any procedural due process
analysis is the idea that "due process, unlike certain legal
rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances. '67 The re-
quirements of due process are flexible and are deter-
mined by considering competing interests.68
The United States Supreme Court set forth three fac-
tors to consider when determining what procedure is re-
quired by the due process clause before deprivation of a
liberty or property interest occurs:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the prob-
able value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interests, in-
cluding the function involved and the fiscal and adminis-
trative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.69
Under this analysis, due process considerations extend
the right to counsel in civil trials 70 and certain administra-
tive proceedings. 71 The following review focuses on deci-
sional law in the administrative setting.
In a manner similar to the APA approach, the courts in
administrative agency cases make a threshold determina-
tion of whether the proceeding involved is "adjudicatory"
67 Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961) (citingJoint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162
(1950)).
' Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
Id. at 335.
71 Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980).
71 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); compare with Hannah v. Larche, 363
U.S. 420 (1960).
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or "investigatory. ' 72 The case law requires only minimal
procedural safeguards to comply with due process in in-
vestigatory proceedings. 73 If the court, however, deter-
mines that the hearing is "adjudicatory," the due process
protections associated with a judicial trial apply, including
the right to counsel.74 The seminal case on this issue is
Hannah v. Larche.75 In this case, the Supreme Court con-
sidered procedures adopted by the Federal Commission
on Civil Rights whereby the Commission prevented dis-
closure of the complainants' identities and did not permit
the subjects of the investigation to cross-examine
witnesses.76
The Court examined the enabling statute and noted
that the Commission's responsibility was to "investigate
allegations in writing under oath or affirmation that cer-
tain citizens of the United States are being deprived of
their right to vote and have that vote counted by reason of
their color, race, religion, or national origin."' 77 The
Court further emphasized that
[the Commission's function] is purely investigative and
fact-finding. It does not adjudicate. It does not hold trials
or determine anyone's civil or criminal liability. It does
not issue orders. Nor does it indict, punish, or impose any
legal sanctions. It does not make determinations depriv-
ing anyone of his life, liberty, or property. In short, the
Commission ... cannot take any affirmative action which
will affect an individual's legal rights. The only purpose of
its existence is to find facts which may subsequently be
used as the basis for a legislative or executive action.78
The Court distinguished the due process ramifications
of investigative hearings and adjudicatory functions. In
adjudicatory hearings, an agency makes binding determi-
72 See Hannah, 363 U.S. at 440-4 1.
7. See, e.g., id. at 449-51.
74 See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 427-29 (1969).
7. 363 U.S. at 420.
" Id. at 421-22.
77 Id. at 423.
78 Id. at 441.
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nations which directly affect protected interests. In these
hearings "it is imperative that those agencies use the pro-
cedures which have traditionally been associated with the
judicial process.' 7 Furthermore, the Court observed that
adjudicatory hearings are generally governed by the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.80 On the other hand, the
Court explained that when agency action is investigatory,
as in general fact-finding hearings, "it is not necessary
that the full panoply of judicial procedures be used.""'
The Court dismissed as conjecture the concerns of par-
ties that those appearing before the Commission might
suffer irreparable harm by being subjected to public
scorn, loss of employment, and possible subsequent
criminal prosecution based on the Commission's findings.
The Court explained that "even if such collateral conse-
quences were to flow from the Commission's investiga-
tions, they would not be the result of any affirmative
determinations made by the Commission, and they would
not affect the legitimacy of the Commission's investigative
function. '8 2 The Hannah Court, however, observed that:
[T]he investigative process could be completely disrupted
if investigative hearings were transformed into trial-like
proceedings, and if persons who might be indirectly af-
fected by an investigation were given an absolute right to
cross-examine every witness called to testify. Fact-finding
agencies without any power to adjudicate would be di-
verted from their legitimate duties and would be plagued
by the injection of collateral issues that would make the
investigation interminable. Even a person not called as a
witness could demand the right to appear at the hearing,
cross-examine any witness whose testimony or sworn affi-
davit allegedly defamed or incriminated him, and call an
unlimited number of witnesses of his own selection. This
type of proceeding would make a shambles of the investi-
7: Id. at 442.
,I ld. at 445.
" Id. at 442.
M2 Id. at 443.
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gation and stifle the agency in its gathering of facts.8"
In Jenkins v. McKeithen, 4 however, the Supreme Court
distinguished Hannah and held that the procedures em-
ployed by a state commission investigating possible crimi-
nal activity did not comply with requirements of due
process.8 5 The Court remanded the case, asking the
lower court to determine the exact procedures required to
satisfy the due process clause.86 State law empowered the
Commission to investigate individuals and determine
whether there was probable cause to believe that they had
violated criminal laws.8 ' However, the enabling statute
gave the Commission no authority to make binding adju-
dications of criminal violations. Rather, it was given dis-
cretion to make prosecution recommendations to the
Governor.88 The procedure in question did not allow
counsel to cross-examine witnesses. Rather, the statute
limited the investigation to the submission of proposed
questions to the Commission to be asked at the Commis-
sion's discretion.8 9  Furthermore, persons under investi-
gation could not call witnesses to testify.
The Court distinguished Hannah, in effect finding that
criminal prosecution is not a collateral consequence of the
investigation, but rather is the very purpose of this Com-
mission.90 The Court observed: "In short, the Commis-
sion very clearly exercises an accusatory function; it is
empowered to be used.., to find.., individuals guilty of
violating the criminal laws . . . and to brand them as
criminals in public."9 1 The Court concluded that since a
person investigated could not confront and cross-examine
witnesses against him and was drastically limited in his
" Id. at 443-44.
4 95 U.S. 411, 428 (1968).
' Id. at 428.
- Id. at 430.
17 Id. at 416.
Id. at 416-17.
" ld. at 417-18.




right to present evidence on his own behalf, the proce-
dures violated due process requirements.9 2
Trial and appellate court decisions since Hannah and
Jenkins contemplate a broad interpretation of the "investi-
gatory" function of government agencies and broad appli-
cation of the collateral consequence rationale and, thus,
allow minimal due process safeguards. In Georator Corp. v.
EEOC,93 for example, the plaintiff challenged the proce-
dures of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) which allowed, prior to a formal hearing, find-
ings of reasonable cause to believe a charge of discrimina-
tion.94 The court rejected plaintiff's efforts to invoke APA
procedures to compel a prior hearing.9" The Fourth Cir-
cuit adjudged that the finding of reasonable cause was an
investigative function, reasoning that any determination
was preliminary and neither created an obligation nor im-
posed any liability. 96 The court found that the EEOC's
pronouncement of reasonable cause "is lifeless" and
merely preparation for further proceedings.9 7 The deci-
sion could come to life only at a subsequent civil trial
where a party is provided with the usual procedural
safeguards.98
In reaching its conclusion, the court boldly stated that
"when only investigative powers of an agency are utilized,
due process considerations do not attach." 99 Since pre-
liminary findings are without legal effect, the court found
due process concerns satisfied so long as an opportunity
to be heard is provided before any final agency order is
92 Id. at 428.




97 Id. "No ... finality exists with respect to the EEOC's determination of rea-
sonable cause. Standing alone, it is lifeless, and can fix no obligation nor impose
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entered. 00 The court specifically rejected the argument
that potential admissibility of the reasonable cause deter-
mination in a subsequent civil lawsuit compelled due pro-
cess safeguards. The court reasoned that the finding
would not be binding in a subsequent trial and "would
carry only as much weight as the trial court ascribes to
it."101
Similarly, in Haines v. Askew,' 0 2 a school teacher raised a
due process challenge against the state board of educa-
tion hearing procedures for finding probable cause that a
teacher committed an act justifying punitive action. 0 3
Specifically, the teacher attacked procedures which denied
him active counsel and cross-examination of witnesses
during the hearing. 0 4  The court determined that the
hearings are investigative and upheld the hearing proce-
dure. 0 5 The court reasoned that determinations made by
the Professional Council served only as recommendations
to the Commissioner of Education and findings of prob-
able cause could not, without a separate hearing, result in
punitive action against a teacher. 0 6 Consequently, the
basic rights of active counsel and cross-examination,
which would be provided at the subsequent hearing, were
not required at the probable cause phase. °7
In Goldberg v. Kelly,'10 one of the relatively few reported
decisions holding that due process requires an adminis-
trative agency to provide a full panoply of procedural
safeguards, the Supreme Court considered New York
state's procedure for termination of the property interest
in welfare benefits. 0 9 Since it was apparently uncontro-
.. Id. at 769. (citing Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594, 598
(1950)).
,o, Id. at 769.
-2 368 F. Supp. 369 (M.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd mem., 417 U.S. 901 (1974).
lo. Id. at 369.
104 Id. at 372.
lo., Id. at 376-77.
,-' Id. at 377.
07 Id.




verted that the agency action constituted an "adjudica-
tion," the Court applied the basic three-point due process
test. It determined that (i) the welfare recipients' interest
in welfare benefits is great since the benefits are often
their only income; (ii) the stakes are simply too high to
risk erroneous deprivation of the benefits; and, (iii) the
government interest in lessening administrative burdens
was slight and was clearly outweighed by the recipients'
property interests." 0  Consequently, the Court held that
before welfare benefits could be terminated, the recipient
was entitled to an evidentiary hearing which provided an
opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses, the
right to counsel, and the right to present evidence."'
Under the foregoing authorities, NTSB public hearings
may be deemed investigatory proceedings, which are im-
mune from the full range of due process requirements.
However, considering the nature and extent of the inter-
ests at stake for NTSB public hearing parties, the investi-
gatory-adjudicatory distinction and the related collateral
effects rationale of Hannah and its progeny seem attenu-
ated and inappropriate.
Applying the traditional three-point due process analy-
sis to the question at hand, the property and liberty inter-
ests of parties appearing in an NTSB hearing are
manifest. While NTSB probable cause findings may not
be admissible per se in evidence, they surely find their way
into the news media. A party's reputation as a prudent air
carrier or avionics manufacturer, for example, may suffer
immeasurable harm from publication of hearing testi-
mony and accident reports. The prospect of judgments
or settlements predicated on NTSB fact findings plainly
implicates the parties' property rights.
Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of these
rights absent representation by counsel is clear. "Techni-
cal personnel" are not trained or qualified to cross-ex-
amine witnesses. It is ludicrous to suggest that a
.... Id. at 264-66.
.. Id. at 269-71.
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corporate pilot or a design engineer is best suited to assist
the NTSB in confronting an evasive witness with a prior
germane statement. Similarly, the burden of negating the
impact of erroneous NTSB findings in subsequent litiga-
tion is just as wrong to overlook and even more difficult to
quantify.
Finally, the government's interests in precluding attor-
neys from public hearings are difficult to discern, much
less to assess. The NTSB's expression of its intent boils
down to basic agency "beliefs." First, "technical person-
nel" are better able to assist the NTSB at public hearings
than lawyers. Second, lawyers inevitably bring the lethal
"tentacles of litigation" within striking distance of the
NTSB.' 12 Neither "belief" appears founded in the reality
that NTSB public hearings have all the characteristics of
civil trials, including the quest for truth derived from di-
rect and cross-examination of witnesses.
The NTSB acknowledges that there is no greater device
than cross-examination for the discovery of truth. Even
its own regulations mandate the opportunity for cross-ex-
amination. Yet it denies itself, the public, and the parties
who have protected interests at stake, the opportunity to
employ the professionals best qualified to utilize this de-
vice. While the full range of procedural due process pro-
tections may not apply, according to the current status of
the law, the NTSB's rationale for amending section
845.13(a) calls into question the soundness of its action.
C. Judicial Review Under the APA
Quite apart from the procedural requirements of the
APA and the general due process requirements," 13 the
APA's judicial review provisions provide that administra-
tive actions, including the promulgation of regulations,
will be set aside if found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with
112 See supra note 12 and accompanying text; see also 52 Fed. Reg. 9678 (1987);
51 Fed. Reg. 7277 (1986).
',.- See supra note 55-109 and accompanying text.
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the law."' "1 4 In reviewing a regulation under this stan-
dard, a court may not substitute its judgment for that of
the agency."15 Nevertheless, courts have given a pre-
sumption of regularity to administrative regulations and
are deferential to the administrative agencies' promulga-
tions of regulations.' ' 6
For an administrative regulation to withstand review
under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the agency
must articulate a satisfactory explanation for the regula-
tion including "a rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made."' 1 7 Thus, judicial deference
to administrative regulations will not extend to the valida-
tion of regulations merely because a judge may conceive a
rational basis for its application." 8 In fact, the Supreme
Court has expressly stated that the " 'presumption of reg-
ularity afforded an agency in fulfilling its statutory man-
date' is not equivalent to 'the minimum rationality a
statute must bear in order to withstand analysis under the
Due Process Clause'.'""9 Therefore, if the agency has not
provided a rational basis for a particular agency regula-
tion, a reviewing court should not attempt to create
one. 
20
Under the APA, agency regulations will be set aside as
arbitrary and capricious if
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an im-
portant aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for
its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to
" 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983).
", Sierra Pac. Indus. v. Lyng, 866 F.2d 1099, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989).
11; See Natural Resources Defense Council v. United States EPA, 822 F.2d 104,
111 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
"17 Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 626 (1986) (quoting State
Farm, 463 U.S. at 43).
id. at 626.
Id. at 626-27 (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 n.9).
"2' State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
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a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. 12
Several courts have applied this analysis to invalidate
agency regulations. For example, in Bowen v. American
Hospital Association,122 the Supreme Court considered
whether certain regulations promulgated by the Secretary
of Health and Human Services were reasonably related to
the enabling statute.1 23 The regulations in question pro-
vided the Secretary with broad authority to conduct on-
site investigations of hospitals, review hospital records,
and participate in medical decision making on certain
cases. 1
2 4
The stated basis for the regulation was that various hos-
pitals were unlawfully refusing to provide handicapped in-
dividuals with medical care and refusing to report medical
neglect of handicapped infants.' 25 The agency asserted
that the regulations were needed to combat these
problems. The Court found no evidence to support the
allegation of unlawful discrimination. Specifically, the
Court concluded that the hospital's failure to provide
medical treatment to certain handicapped children related
to lack of parental consent.' 26 Moreover, on a review of
the record pertaining to the forty-nine actual investiga-
tions summarized in the preamble to the challenged regu-
lation, no evidence indicated that any hospital either
failed, or was accused of failing, to make an appropriate
report to an agency. In fact, the Court found that many of
the hospitals had voluntarily reported instances of sus-
pected medical neglect. 2 7 Branding the agency's asserted
factual basis for the challenged regulation "manifestly in-
correct," 12 8 the Court affirmed the judgments below
121 Id.
'2 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
1'2 Id. at 647.
4 Id.; see 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 (1989).
12 Bowen, 476 U.S. at 628-29.
1'2 Id. at 611, 630-31.
,.7 Id. at 638 n.24.
12 Id. at 637.
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which invalidated the regulations.129
The Tenth Circuit also employed the rational basis test
to invalidate an administrative regulation in Humana of Au-
rora, Inc. v. Heckler.130 There, a hospital challenged a regu-
lation which substantially departed from prior methods of
reimbursing hospitals for treatment of Medicare pa-
tients.'' The agency asserted that the change in the
longstanding policy resulted from the agency's payment
of "an excessive portion of malpractice insurance
costs.' 3 2  The agency relied on a consultant's study
which allegedly established that malpractice damage
awards were significantly lower for Medicare patients than
they were for the general patient population.
The court invalidated the regulation because it could
find no rational connection between the facts before the
agency and the promulgation of the regulation. Accord-
ing to the court, the "fundamental nexus between evi-
dence and agency action is absent."' 3  The Court
emphasized that the consultant's report relied upon by
the Secretary contained various deficiencies and was in-
sufficient to justify the regulation. The report, for exam-
ple, was not designed for the purpose of upholding such a
regulation, and was even criticized by its authors on
points essential to the use sought to be made of it.'" 4 In
reaching its decision, the court found the agency had
fallen short of the requirement that, in promulgating a
change in a long-standing policy, "the agency must clearly
articulate the basis for the change."'' 3 5
As the foregoing cases illustrate, determination of the
validity of an administrative regulation must begin with a
', Id. at 647.
753 F.2d 1579 (10th Cir. 1985).
"' Id. at 1580.
132 Id.
1. Id. at 1582.
1.34 Id.
1.1 Id. (quoting Dimensional Fin. Corp. v. Board of Governors, 744 F.2d 1402,
1409 (10th Cir. 1984)). In the same vein are the decisions holding rescission of
agency regulations to the identical arbitrary and capricious standard of review.
See, e.g., State Farm, 463 U.S. at 44.
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review of the statute empowering the agency to promul-
gate the regulation. Here the NTSB's enabling statutes
are the Federal Aviation Act of 1958136 and the Independ-
ent Safety Board Act of 1974.137
The Federal Aviation Act sets forth the general duties
of the NTSB.'1 s The Act empowers the NTSB to ascer-
tain facts and find the cause of transportation accidents by
several means, including public hearings. 39 While the
Act gives the NTSB latitude to set hearing procedures,
nowhere in the statute nor in its legislative history does
Congress mention attorney representation at public
hearings.
The 1974 Independent Safety Board Act requires the
NTSB to investigate and determine the facts, conditions,
and circumstances, as well as the causes, or probable
causes, of any transportation accidents. 40 Findings made
during the NTSB hearings are to be given to the congres-
sional, federal, state, and local agencies concerned with
transportation. 4 ' The goal is to avoid the recurrence of
such accidents. The Act empowers the NTSB to establish
regulations binding on persons subject to its investigatory
jurisdiction. 142
Nowhere in the Independent Safety Board Act does
Congress indicate that the NTSB is empowered to pre-
clude attorneys from public hearings designed to give the
parties the right to cross-examine witnesses. Nor does the
statute provide that the preclusion of attorneys will assist
in NTSB investigations and prevent future transportation
accidents. This is important because, at least since 1973
(a year before the Act was passed by Congress), NTSB
regulations purported to restrict party representation to
counsel other than one "who also represents claimants or
1- 49 U.S.C. app. § 1441 (1988).
17 Id. §§ 1901-1907.
" d. § 1441(a).
,2, Id. § 1441(c).
.... Id. § 1903(a)(1)(A)-(F).
14, Id. § 1903(a)(2),(3).
1 Id. § 1903(a)(6).
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insurers."' Under these circumstances, Congress is pre-
sumed to have known and approved of counsel represen-
tation for parties to NTSB public hearings. 44 But did
Congress intend to mandate attorney representation of
parties to NTSB public hearings? If not, does the Safety
Board's rationale for changing long-standing policy mea-
sure up to the rational basis requirement of the APA?
The NTSB's formal statement of reasons for the 1986
section 845.13(a) amendment appears in two separate
publications in the Federal Register. 45 Four separate rea-
sons for the amendment may be gleaned from the first
formal statement, each of which rest on the NTSB's "be-
lief" and nothing more. As a reason for the amendment,
the NTSB in its second formal statement states that:
Since the parties to a field investigation of an accident are
virtually always also designated as parties to any hearing
held in connection with the accident and since the hearing
is an extension of the field investigation, the Board be-
lieves that ideally a person who represented a party during
an earlier phase of the investigation should serve as
spokesperson for the party at the hearing....
This amendment would require spokespersons to be
employees or members of the party they represent be-
cause such personnel are most likely to possess an inti-
mate knowledge and understanding of the functions,
activities, operations or products of the party they repre-
sent and therefore would be in the best position to render
assistance to the Board....
The Board derives the greatest benefit from the insight
and specialized knowledge of qualified technical personnel
who represent parties, and the Board believes that the
parties invited to participate at a hearing should be repre-
sented by a person who theretofore participated in the in-
,4. 49 C.F.R. § 831.11 (1990). An informal review of the NTSB docket reveals
that the NTSB permitted attorney representation at public hearings between 1978
and March, 1986. NTSB investigation records for the period before 1978 were
not available for review.
144 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
1- 51 Fed. Reg. 7277 (1986)(codified at 49 C.F.R. § 845.13(a).(1990)); 52 Fed.
Reg. 9678 (1987).
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vestigation or at the very least an official who supervises
such persons or an employee who possesses comparable
technical qualifications and current work experience.
Although the legal representatives of some parties to
hearings have had transportation-related technical experi-
ence and have contributed to the hearing, the Board be-
lieves that persons who occupy technical rather than legal
positions will be able to offer more to the Board and be
more in keeping with the spirit and purposes of the
inquiry. 146
These reasons hardly explain a sudden and radical
change in long-standing NTSB policy on an issue as im-
portant as representation by counsel at the trial-like pub-
lic hearings. The reasons seem to materialize from
nowhere. Certainly, the Safety Board does not mention
any problems arising out of attorney representations.
The NTSB mentions attorneys only to note that some
legal representatives are technically knowledgeable and
contribute to the merits at the hearings.' 47 Nevertheless
the Board conclusively states that persons occupying tech-
nical positions will offer more to the hearing process.
The NTSB's stated justification for eliminating attor-
neys from the public hearings boils down to two points in
favor of non-lawyer technical personnel: "continuity"
with the field investigation and superior technical knowl-
edge. ' 48 These reasons, however, do not militate against
representation by counsel at the public hearing. Even a
cursory analysis of the NTSB's "beliefs" suggests that the
agency had more in mind than it published in its first for-
mal statement of reasons for the 1986 amendment.
One year after the amendment took effect, the NTSB
published a request for comments on the amendments in
the Federal Register.' 49 There, the NTSB sought "sug-
gested modifications to the amendment which would not
'4, 51 Fed. Reg. 7277-78 (1986).
'. Id. at 7278.
- See id. at 7277-78.
14t, 52 Fed. Reg. 9678 (1987) (amendment codified at 49 C.F.R. § 845.13(a)
(1990)).
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sacrifice its objectives. "150 In framing this request, the
Safety Board stated yet another reason for the
amendment:
Part 845 is intended, among other things, to prevent the
injection of liability interests into the Board's hearings as
evidenced by the prohibition against a party being repre-
sented by a person who also represents claimants or insur-
ers. [49 CFR 845.13(b)] As noted above, the purpose of
the Board's accident inquiries is not to determine the
rights or liabilities of any person, and, consistent with this
objective the amendment served to distance further the
Board's hearing from the litigation that inevitably arises
from major transportation accidents by precluding attor-
neys from acting as spokespersons.' 5'
In this explanation, the NTSB elevates non-determina-
tion of the parties' liability to an affirmative goal of the
accident investigation. While the NTSB may "believe"
that this is one of its goals, Congress has not said so.
Neither the enabling statute 5 2 nor the related legislative
history15 3 says or means that avoiding determination of li-
ability issues is an NTSB function, much less "the purpose
of the Board's accident inquiries."' 54 The issues of causa-
tion and liability plainly overlap more often than not.
Apparently, the NTSB's desire to avoid undue influence
by outside factors such as civil litigation has exceeded ra-
tional bounds. It appears to have led the Safety Board to
restate its own purpose in an after-the-fact effort to ex-
plain why it regulated attorneys out of the public hearing.
Several of the NTSB's stated "beliefs" are simply wrong
and they are not accompanied by any rational
explanation.
The NTSB's second formal statement of purpose be-
hind the 1986 amendment also fails to state any basis for
' Id. at 9678-79.
'.' Id. at 9679.
1.12 49 U.S.C. app. § 1441 (1988).
'." See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 2487, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1962 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3175.
52 Fed. Reg. 9678, 9679 (1987).
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the opinion that the mere appearance of attorneys auto-
matically injects extraneous liability issues into the public
hearing and that excluding them "distances" the investi-
gation from the "inevitable" litigation. Certainly, there
are less intrusive ways of controlling public hearings than
outright banning lawyers. The Board has promulgated
regulations governing the conduct of the public hearing.
The chairman of the board of inquiry, for example, is em-
powered to determine issues, to decide the admissibility
of evidence and to generally regulate the proceedings. 55
These regulations alone give the chairman enough power
to limit both the matters presented at a public hearing
and the means of presenting them.
The NTSB misses the mark in its belief that attorney
representatives handicap the Safety Board by reasons of
technical knowledge limitations. Attorneys are trained to
conduct litigation involving many disparate arts, sciences,
disciplines, professions, transactions, and events. It is ir-
rational to suggest that attorneys cannot acquire sufficient
technical knowledge about the parties' products, func-
tions, activities, and operations to present a matter to the
Safety Board. To the extent that a particular technical
employee of a particular party may be more knowledgea-
ble than counsel, both may be allowed to participate at
the hearing.
To realize the foregoing "beliefs," the NTSB has sacri-
ficed the rights of the parties, the public, and even itself,
to a complete investigation record born of effective cross-
examination at public hearings. To state the proposition
that a technician can cross-examine a witness better than a
lawyer is to refute it. To deny attorney representation at
public hearings is to negate the NTSB's own acknowl-
edgement that cross-examination is the primary vehicle of
the public hearing's trial-like quest for truth. As one com-
mentator noted:
It needs but the simple statement of the nature of cross-
,. 49 C.F.R. § 845.20 (1990).
[56
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examination to demonstrate its indispensable character in
all trials of question of fact. No case reaches the stage of
litigation unless there are two sides to it. If the witnesses
on one side deny or qualify the statements made by those
on the other, which side is telling the truth?... How shall
we tell, how to make it apparent to a jury of disinterested
men who are to decide between the litigants? Obviously,
by the means of cross-examination.' 56
Non-lawyers simply are not equipped to participate in
and contribute to an NTSB public hearing the way lawyers
can. The NTSB's regulation limiting cross-examination
to non-lawyer representatives is a non-sequitur. It im-
pedes the very purpose and effectiveness of the right to
cross-examine witnesses which the NTSB's own regula-
tions confer on every party. 157  The rationale underlying
the NTSB's 1986 amendment to 49 C.F.R. § 845.13(a) is
questionable at best.
V. THE PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE
In its March, 1987 request for comments on the amend-
ment to section 845.13(a), the NTSB identified specific is-
sues which it isolated for comment.' 5 8  These issues
suggest that the NTSB was considering modification of
the amendment to permit attorney representation. The
pertinent questions to this discussion include:
Should parties that are involved or are likely to become
involved in litigation stemming from the accident be per-
mitted to be represented by a technically knowledgeable
attorney if the attorney could be isolated from such litiga-
tion?How could the Board administer and enforce such a
condition? Would an attorney who is not an employee or
member of a party have sufficient knowledge of the opera-
tions and activities to effectively assist the Board?' 59
i-r F. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSs EXAMINATION 21 (1936).
'17 49 C.F.R. § 845.25(a) (1990).
1- 52 Fed. Reg. 9678, 9679-80 (1987) (amendment codified at 49 C.F.R.
845.13(a)(1990)).
,. Id. at 9680.
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These questions seem to indicate that the NTSB was
groping for a resolution of the difficulties it perceived to
arise from an attorney's relative lack of technical knowl-
edge. Lawyers are trained and experienced at immersing
themselves in a particular area of technical knowledge to
prepare and present a case. Furthermore, to the extent it
may be desirable to isolate the parties' NTSB counsel
from the parties' involvement in civil litigation, an attor-
ney certification to this effect, on pain of contempt,
should be effective.
It has been two years since the NTSB expressed any re-
newed interest towards modifying section 845.13(a). The
Safety Board apparently has not acted on its original incli-
nation despite reviewing the nearly universally unfavora-
ble comments it has received from the Aircraft Owners
and Pilots Association, the National Business Aircraft As-
sociation, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Fed-
eral Railroad Administration, the Air Transport
Association of America (representing more than two
dozen commercial airlines), the Chairman of the Trans-
portation Committee of the American Bar Association
and others. 160
Any change in section 845.13(a) will apparently have to
originate in Congress or the courts. Based on the analysis
set forth in section IV, supra, it would appear the best
prospects for a successful challenge to the substance of
Section 845.13(a), short of an express Congressional
mandate, lies in judicial review under the APA.
-0 In all, the NTSB docket contains 17 comments from government agencies,
private associations, corporations and attorneys who have represented parties at
NTSB public hearings. One comment was favorable; 18 were unfavorable. See 52
Fed. Reg. 9678 (1987).
[56
